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In his pioneering study of African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia, Charles van Onselen 
showed how the worker's desire to sell his labour in the best market possible led African 
migrants from the northern territories (Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia) to adopt a variety 
of ingenious methods to resist the regulations of the state and employers and make their way 
to higher paying centres of employment in the Union of South Africa. [l] Van Onselen's 
brief analysis of this clandestine migration terminates in 1933 but there is sufficient evidence 
to show that the phenomenon he describes continued well into and beyond the 1940s. This 
paper examines some aspects of this migration and the ways in which the Southern 
Rhodesian state responded to a movement that denied their employers access to important 
supplies of labour, in a period of rapid economic expansion. 
A very large proportion of the migrant workers who crossed the Zambezi and entered 
Southern Rhodesia did so with the definite intention of making their way to South Africa. 
Once in Southern Rhodesia these migrants took out passes to seek work in areas as far south 
as possible, deserting their employers at a favourable opportunity to continue their journey 
southwards, until they arrived at the porous borders of the colony where they made use of 
numerous routes to evade the police patrols and cross into the Union or Bechuanaland. Some 
of these migrants enjoyed a relatively smooth passage across the borders by obtaining passes 
to enter the Union from friends and relatives already working there, thus enabling them 
legally to board a train or lorry service to cross the border. The wartime censorship of 
African mail helps to confirm "the existence of widespread attempts by natives to obtain any 
kind of Transvaal native pass to leave the colony". [2] 
The time that was spent by northern migrants journeying to the southern border of the colony 
was much reduced in 1938 when the government introduced a free lorry service for 
transporting migrants from the Zambezi to Umtali and Mtoko. Before the introduction of 
this service, which became a source of bitter complaints by some employers, intending 
clandestine migrants, having walked through the Zambezi valley, arrived in the colony "so 
tired and debilitated" that they had to "work for two or three months in Southern Rhodesia to 
get in condition for proceeding ... to the Union, and possibly to find money to travel 
otherwise than on foot to the border". [3] By making use of the lorry service migrants 
arrived in Southern Rhodesia in much better health, and once they possessed the necessary 
funds they could make their way rapidly to the border. The speed with which some of them 
arrived in the border areas was one of the points noted by a police officer in Kezi when he 
enlightened his superiors on some of the strategies employed by clandestine migrants: 
The majority of natives arrested have been found to have new 
Registration Certificates issued at some port of entry, such as 
Umtali or Mtoko, and usually have been in the Colony only a 
week or so. This points to the fact that when the native entered 
the Colony he had no intention of seeking employment but was 
merely en route to the Union of South Africa. Such natives have, 
for the most part, been transported from their country of origin at 
the expense of the Southern Rhodesian Government. Letters have 
been found on these natives from friends in the Union of South 
Africa giving full particulars of the route to be taken, situation of 
Police Stations and such like places to be avoided in order to get 
through. They usually have considerable sums of money on them 
for the journey. When questioned as to their destination the 
answer invariably is the Antelope or Legion Mines; it is 
significant that natives, only in the Colony a few days, know of 
these mines, situated on the border; had they required mining 
work in the Colony they could easily have obtained employment 
at the numerous mines in the Colony passed on their journey to 
this, the most ~outherly, portion of the Colony. [4] 
Many of the migrants from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia intending to travel to South 
Africa made their way to Bulawayo whence they used a variety of routes to travel further 
1 south. In July 1939 the Assistant Superintendent of Police at Bulawayo claimed there were 
two main routes that were used by migrants from Bulawayo: by rail to Gwanda or West 
Nicholson, thence to Beitbridge by Railway Lorry Service; or by privately owned motor 
service from Bulawayo via Matobo and Kezi to the Antelope and Legion mines, the latter 
I being some 18 miles from the Bechuanaland border. [5] In one of its numerous attempts to curb the movement of clandestine labour the government, in 1940, issued orders prohibiting 
Native Commissioners and the Police at Gwanda and West Nicholson from issuing "passes 
I to seek work" to Africans wishing to travel to Beitbridge. It was soon discovered, however, 
that Africans were switching to other areas, such as Fort Victoria, in order to obtain passes to 
l travel to Beitbridge. [6] Those who could not obtain passes to seek work in the Beitbridge 
l area could still make the journey southwards with one of the African or Indian-owned lorry 
services that operated on the fringes of the law; others who could not afford this luxury were 
forced to travel on foot. 
For those migrants who travelled to the Legion mine, the journey south was continued on 
foot. [7] They entered Bechuanaland along its north-eastern border, travelling through the 
sparsely populated area between the Shashi and Limpopo rivers, then across the Limpopo 
I into the Transvaal. [8] The routes through Bechuanaland were also popular with indigenous 
Africans. In the middle of 1942, it was estimated that between 50 and 100 such migrants 
were entering Bechuanaland each day, an exodus that was "much in excess of the normally 
observed flow". [9] The exodus was undoubtedly encouraged by the need to escape wartime 
compulsory labour. This was first introduced in 1940 for construction work on the Empire 
l Air Training Scheme and was extended in August 1942 to incorporate agrarian labour. [l01 
Some of these migrants crossed the border with the hope of being recruited by the 
l Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) which had offices at Bobonong's Kraal, 
some 60 miles from the Southern Rhodesia border. The WNLA was not allowed to recruit 
Africans from Southern Rhodesia, but the migrants circumvented this regulation by giving a 
false name and other information in order to pay for a one-year tax in the Protectorate to 
obtain a tax receipt purporting to be that of an African from Bechuanaland. [l l] 
I The routes from Bulawayo were by no means the only ones that were used by clandestine 
migrants, nor were Africans from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia the only ones to take 
advantage of Southern Rhodesia as a stepping-stone to the Union. A systematic survey of 
l 
I clandestine migration conducted by the BSA Police in 1944 provided a detailed account of 
I several routes along which migrants travelled to the Union and the territories/areas from 
which they originated. Between 25 August 1944 and 20 December 1944, a police contingent 
travelled a total of 4,041 miles through the whole of the southern portion of the colony; and 
to border areas in the Transvaal, Mozambique and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. They 
1 patrolled all the main routes used by migrants; checked the rail and lony services; visited a 
l 
number of mines, f m s ,  stores, and twenty police stations at which they made notes from 
l records; and interviewed ANCs and NCs at twelve Native Departments and officials in the 
l 
l 
Transvaal. At the end of this exercise, it was estimated that a total of 33,500 clandestine 
l migrants had travelled through Southern Rhodesia to the Union in 1944; 40 per cent of this 
I figure came from Mozambique, 30 per cent from Nyasaland, 10 per cent from Northern 
Rhodesia and 20 per cent from Southern Rhodesia. [l21 
The majority of the migrants from Mozambique travelled to the Union via routes 2(c), 3 and 
4 as shown on the map. The tight security around the Kruger National Park prevented 
migrants from entering the Union direct from Mozambique; they therefore had to chart 
routes through Southern Rhodesia in order to enter South Africa. In most cases these 
migrants entered the colony at Beacon 106 in South Chipinga, avoiding registration in 
Southern Rhodesia on entry. They then cut across the south-eastern portion of Chipinga, 
Zaka, Nuanetsi and Beitbridge areas, from where they entered the Union and were taken by 
Transvaal recruiters to Messina or Louis Trichardt for employment. Migrants from the 
northern parts of Mozambique often registered on entry into Southern Rhodesia and then 
travelled along routes similar to those used by Nyasas (esp 3b). Clandestine migrants from 
Nyasaland usually registered at Umtali or Mtoko; some then travelled via route 3(b) but the 
majority went via routes Nos. 1 and 2 and generally did not enter employment; sometimes 
they worked in the colony for short periods and "in some instances they pretendred] to offer 
themselves for employment for convenience and abscond[ed] without actually commencing 
work". 
Northern Rhodesian migrants were generally found on routes 1 and 2 (a) and (b). 
Clandestine migrants from Southern Rhodesia, 20,697 of whom were in regular employment 
in the Union in 1943, were found to be the ones most difficult to detect; they were "very 
rarely seen by patrols except perhaps in the Plumtree area where Mashonas can be identified 
as migrants". [l31 Indigenous Africans did not require a pass for movements within the 
colony, except in the case of those wishing to enter the towns; this meant, as the Police 
frequently stated, that they could easily wander about the border area without being arrested 
since no offence was committed until they were actually caught trying to cross the 
border. [l41 
Most of the clandestine migrants who evaded employers and border patrols to enter the 
Union of South Africa intended to make their way to Johannesburg or some other major 
industrial centre. Partly because of pass law regulations, the majority of these migrants 
found themselves having to work for short periods with Transvaal farmers before obtaining 
passes to seek work in the industrial centres. There was no difficulty in finding employment 
with fanners in the Transvaal, where wages were on average three times higher than in 
Southern Rhodesia. On the contrary, migrants experienced more trying to avoid 
farm labour in the Transvaal. Expansion in the gold mining and secondary industry in South 
Africa in the later 1930s created in its wake an expanded demand for African labour. This 
was partly satisfied by a flow of workers from the rural areas to the cities, which in turn 
resulted in a "serious shortage of farm labour in Transvaal, Free State and Natal". [IS] To 
counter the drain on their labour supply, farmers in the Transvaal began to look more to the 
north, to the thousands of migrants who wished to gain access to the relatively higher wage 
economy of South Africa. On crossing the border into the Union clandestine migrants found 
themselves in a territory swarming with recruiting agents and their African runners, who 
spoke "every language and dialect in Rhodesia and Nyasaland". Since most of these workers 
entered the country without passports and permits to seek work - avoiding the South African 
immigration authorities at Beitbridge - they were placed at the mercy of the recruiters, who, 
for most of the period, were operating in an area where recruiting was meant to be 
banned. [l61 The majority of the recruiters congregated around the Messina area. An 
example of the methods they employed was given by the Governor of Nyasaland: 
... the Northern native is allowed to look for employment in certain 
areas of the Union upon taking out a 51- permit. The Permit Office 
is at Messina, 9 miles from the Beit Bridge over the Limpopo. The 
gap is filled with labour touts and fanners' agents, who collar the 
wretched Northern native under the threat of handing him over to 
the Immigration authorities for punishment for being without a 
permit. Yet the Union Government will not move the Permit 
Officeto the Beit Bridge for the reason, I suspect, that this would 
antagonise the farmers of the Northern Transvaal. [l71 
Those migrants who were rounded up by the recruiters were forced to put their marks to 
contracts with Transvaal farmers, the contents of which many did not understand. On the 
farms the migrants worked under "near-slavery" conditions, some of which were made 
public in the post-war years. The Bethel area of the Transvaal, where 90 per cent of the 
work-force were clandestine migrants, gained notoriety for its oppressive conditions of 
employment. In 1947 the Johannesburg Sunday Times wrote of "the well-substantiated 
reports of natives labouring under the crack of the sjambok" in the area, and of one African 
who was sjamboked to death on a farm. [l81 Knowledgeable Africans did their utmost to 
avoid the recruiters. This was quite hazardous, even fatal at times, as was noted by one 
Labour Officer when commenting on a recruiting expedition that took place in April 1945: 
An European in charge of a lorry load of recruiters observed a 
native who obviously was trying to hide in the bush. The European 
instructed his Induna to chase the native and 'bring him in'. The 
latter was out-paced and felled with a knobkerrie. The two-inch 
scalp wound resulting from this attack was treated by a Messina 
doctor daily for a week before the native, then very ill, was 
admitted to the hospital as an in-patient. Two days later he died 
of tetanus. Subsequently the Induna, one Petrus Maraba, was 
arrested and brought to trial. Pleading guilty to, I believe, a charge 
of assault he was given a suspended sentence of two years. The 
accused thereafter left the Court a free man. [l91 
How best to put a stop to, or limit, the flow of clandestine migrants to the Union of South 
Africa, was a question that severely taxed the imagination of settlers and the resources of the 
settler state for several decades. The intensity with which this problem was tackled was 
closely related to the varying perceptions of the "labour shortage". Thus one finds that 
during the Depression the police were prepared to turn a blind eye to clandestine migration 
and refused to press earlier demands for South Africa to repatriate illegal migrants from 
Southern Rhodesia whom they arrested. [20] With the recovery from the Depression, 
however, and the expansion of economic activity during the war, employer organizations - 
especially those representing farmers and miners - waged a ceaseless campaign for the state 
to intervene and stem this movement. In most instances, it was the BSA Police who were 
asked to solve the problem by enforcing more patrols of the border areas. But such 
measures, when implemented, had a minimal impact. The explanation for this given by the 
Head of the CID in Mashonaland was typical of the response of Police Officers who were 
urged to be more vigilant in their border patrols: "Our Southern and South Western borders 
are more than 400 miles in extent and for the greater part of the year can be crossed with ease 
at any place. It is an impossible task for the BSAP to cover this distance by day and by night 
..." [21] The government entertained the idea of declaring the entire area within twenty miles 
of the southern borders of the colony a "native free zone", a most impracticable solution that 
was never put into effect. [22] In 1939 they decided to prohibit migrants from being issued 
with passes to enter, visit, or seek work in border districts. But there was no noticeable 
change; Africans simply developed more devious routes for entering the Union. 
The patrols also discovered that arresting migrants who were found attempting to make an 
illegal exit from Southern Rhodesia was not a simple task. Such was the determination of 
African workers to sell their labour in the best market possible that they violently resisted 
being arrested by the police, especially if they were travelling in large groups. The attacks on 
African police and messengers who stopped northern migrants on their way to the border and 
asked them to produce passes became so frequent that local officials and the police had to 
order African staff to "refrain from questioning aliens re passes, etc unless they are in a 
position to obtain aid from the indigenous population". The Chief Native Commissioner 
(CNC) recommended in February 1940 that additional police staff be drafted to the Gwanda 
District, including Beitbridge, to help enforce the law [23]; but this measure, if adopted, was 
not an adequate deterrent to the clandestine migrants as three years later the BSA Police were 
still filing reports on Africans who successfully crossed the Beit bridge after assaulting 
members of the force. [24] 
The Police, who grew weary of insinuations of incompetence, repeatedly warned that "the 
solution lies - not in repressive legislation which anyway cannot be enforced - but in raising 
the standard of pay and conditions of service to those obtaining in the Union". [25] Yet 
employers and state officials continued to look to the power of the state to effect greater 
control over clandestine migration. Another area in which it was felt that the state could be 
more vigilant in controlling the exodus of migrants was in the sphere of labour recruiting. 
Several employers were convinced that the flow of labour to the south was being assisted by 
illegal recruiting agents who were operating in the colony on behalf of South African 
employers. Once again the BSA Police were forced to respond to this complaint: this time 
by using African undercover agents, known as "traps", to detect any illicit recruiting of 
Africans for employment in the Union by pretending to be intending migrants to the Union. 
"Trapping", as the method of investigation was called, was authorized in the early months of 
1939 [26], but its implementation revealed no significant illegal recruiting for the Union. 
According to the CNC, African touts were probably at work on mines and in towns, "but 
dealing with the problem in the aggregate, recruitment [was] a minor factor3'. [27] 
There is much evidence, then, to support the view that the Rhodesian state was powerless to 
introduce measures effectively to control the flow of clandestine labour from its territory to 
the Union of South Africa The plain truth a b u t  clandestine migration, which was duly 
acknowledged by the Secretary for Native Affairs, was that "without the co-operation of the 
Union authoiities, nothing short of the counter-part of a land 'Atlantic Wall' [was] likely to 
help the situation". [28] Not having the resources for constructing such a "Wall", the 
government devoted a good deal of effort to securing an agreement with the Union 
Government over measures to stop or limit the flow of clandestine migrants. They were 
supported in these efforts by the northern governments who, at the behest of the Colonial 
Office, were showing greater interest in the adverse effects of migration on their rural 
communities. Officials in the north also realized that a more organized system of recruitment 
could yield more revenue for the state. 
Southern Rhodesian officials took every opportunity at international meetings on migrant 
labour to register their demand for the Union government to exercise greater control over the 
inflow of clandestine labour. The existence of clandestine migration was one of the reasons 
advanced by the Rhodesians for opposing increases in the number of labourers that the 
WNLA was allowed to recruit in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. They insisted that such 
quotas should not be increased while the Union authorities turned a blind eye to clandestine 
migration. Furthermore, they believed that allowing the WNLA to extend its activities in the 
northern territories only created more scope for the organization's recruiting propaganda 
encouraging more Africans to migrate illegally to South Africa. These arguments were put 
before Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary, in London in July 1939 when the Prime 
Minister, Godfrey Huggins, spoke of a recruitment "racket'y through which Africans were 
enticed across the Limpopo. The only possible means of controlling clandestine migration, 
he said, was by the Union adopting a passport control system, but the government were 
failing to act for political reasons: they were fearful of losing the support of the back veld 
farmers who could face acute labour shortage if the system was introduced. [29] The 
Colonial Office's labour adviser, Major Orde Browne, who was present at the meeting 
between Huggins and MacDonald, later added his support for the Prime Minister's 
perception of the political constraints faced by the Union government: 
Mr Huggins pressed for the maintenance of some sort of pass 
system in the Union, and said with truth that this could easily 
be introduced. There is however little hope of any such measure 
being adopted, since the farmers rely largely on the influx of 
ignorant and helpless Northern natives, to keep their labour 
supply, the kaffir being increasingly difficult to coerce. The 
farmer's vote is probably quite strong enough to dictate the 
Government's policy, since the Chamber of Mines is politically 
poorly represented, though financially strong. [30] 
Despite the known political strength of agrarian capital in the Union, the Rhodesians and 
their northern neighbours pressed ahead with negotiations over the control of clandestine 
migration. In August 1939, a recommendation was made by the three central African 
territories for a joint approach to be made to the Union government on the introduction of a 
passport system for northern labour. [3 l] When preparing their case for presentation to the 
Union, the Southern Rhodesian government was advised by Charles Bullock, the CNC, to 
highlight the problem of disrespect for law and order displayed by clandestine migrants. [32] 
The thought of insubordinate Africans must have struck a chord with Smuts, who agreed to a 
meeting in Johannesburg with his northern neighbours. [33] The meeting never 
materialized [34], becoming one of a series of missed appointments on the subject of 
clandestine migration. Orde Browne was not surprised as "General Smuts always tactfully 
ignored negotiations" on the subject. [35] 
The introduction of compulsory labour during the war and the difficulties of effecting 
wartime discussions on the subject would have been contributory factors to a waning of 
interest in negotiations with the Union during the war years. Once the war was over, 
compulsory labour withdrawn and the pre-war "labour shortage" re-emerged, the need to 
establish an agreement with the Union returned to the top of the agenda of labour issues. In 
making recommendations aimed at resolving the post-war shortage of labour, A J Huxtable, 
the Commissioner of Native Labour, warned that far too much attention had been paid to 
acquiring labour from the north as opposed to controlling and regulating the flow to the 
South. "It is almost useless to tap new sources of supplies when the migration to the South 
continues", he advised; and, unless some labour agreement was negotiated with the Union, 
"the very future of the Colony will receive a severe check". If only they could save around 
10,000 from those migrating to the south, the colony's labour problems would be solved, 
wrote Huxtable. [36] His concern over the exodus of clandestine migrants was echoed at the 
meetings of the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission, where he acted as chairman. 
Claiming that clandestine migration was "seriously jeopardizing the development of [the] 
Colony", the Commission asked the government to approach the Central African Council 
(CAC) with the request for a joint approach to the Union by the Central Aliican territories for 
the implementation of some means of controlling migration, possibly by means of a quota, 
which could be organized through a control organization in co-operation with the three 
territories. [37] 
The three Central African territories continued to find common cause in pursuing a Migrant 
Labour Agreement with the Union government. Following a suggestion by the CAC, a joint 
delegation led by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, the Acting Governor of 
Nyasaland and the Governor of Northern Rhodesia met with Field-Marshal Smuts and other 
Union representatives in Pretoria, in August 1947, for discussions on the possibility of the 
Union becoming a party to the Central African Migrant Labour Agreement. In his opening 
speech to the conference Smuts "fully endorsed" the proposals by the northern governments 
on the control and care of migrant labour. He said that although they welcomed the labour, 
especially the Transvaal farmers, they would like to have arrangements with the Central 
African territories in order to avoid having an "uncontrolled mob" in the Union, an 
occurrence that caused great difficulties during the Depression. [38] The Secretary for the 
CAC "felt that, if one could have presented the Central African Agreement and suggested 
that another set of initials would look very pretty on it, [Smuts] might have signed, there and 
then"; but they "soon found that his advisers were rather tougher in negotiations". [39] They 
were "more obsessed by the difficulties than the attractiveness of comprehensive 
arrangements for regulation of the flow to and from the Union". 1401 A follow-up meeting 
was held with the Union representatives in Salisbury in December, but this only helped to 
confirm that the Union government was still constrained by the political power of agrarian 
capital. As at the Pretoria meeting, the Union representatives were not willing to give any 
undertaking to reject clandestine migrants. The most they were prepared to recommend to 
their government was a reduction of such immigrants' authorized period of stay in the Union 
to nine months. The request for legislative action to enforce arrangements such as deferred 
pay and repatriation was ruled out of the question by the representatives, especially with a 
general election around the corner. [41] 
The Nationalist government which emerged in South Africa in 1948 was in no haste to enter 
negotiations on the control of clandestine migration. The CAC reported in February 1950 
that after the elections "repeated pressure" was brought to bear on the Malan government for 
discussions, but "with no concrete result up till now". [42] At a conference in Salisbury in 
October 1950 representatives of the Central African territories and the Union of South Africa 
agreed to recommend to their government proposals for a migrant labour agreement. These 
included the acceptance by the Central African governments of an undertaking to issue 
identity certificates valid for two years to adult male Africans applying to go to South Africa, 
with the caveat that each government could take steps to ensure that "sufficient adult able 
bodied male Africans" were kept within its borders "to meet its own economic requirements 
and to maintain its social structure". There was to be no recruiting in the Central African 
territories on behalf of the Union except by approved organizations; the Union government 
was to discontinue the issuing of permits to clandestine migrants from an agreed date; and 
they were to establish transit depots at or near these borders for transporting legal migrants 
who, they were to ensure, were engaged on satisfactory conditions. [43] 
The Rhodesian officials would have been naive to think that there was any possibility of the 
Malan government agreeing to such terms. In May 195 1 the CAC was informed that "the 
recommendations ... cast considerable obligation on the Union Government without the 
granting of commensurate concessions by the Central African Territories". [44] One year 
later the Union government's rejection of the Central African proposals on migrant labour 
was made in much stronger terms. The government regretted that it could not give an 
undertaking "effectively to prevent the employment of clandestine migrants, because such an 
undertaking cannot be carried out". "If however", the message continued, "would-be 
clandestine immigrants were prevented by the governments of their territories of origin fiom 
coming to the Union, there would be no need for such an undertaking." As the Union 
government saw it, the control of clandestine migration was the responsibility of the Central 
African governments. Implicit in the latter's request for the prohibition of the employment 
of clandestine migrants, argued the Union, was the suggestion that they be repatriated or be 
permitted to starve, but repatriation was "exceedingly expensive" and starvation could not be 
"seriously contemplated". For the Union government, "the only feasible method of reducing 
clandestine immigration" was by increasing the opportunities for Africans to migrate legally 
to places of employment in the Union. Such a system existed with regard to the gold-mining 
industry but the imposition of restrictions prevented many Africans from making use of it, 
argued the South Africans, who saw increased quotas for the Rand as one way of stemming 
the flow of clandestine migrants. [45] 
The Rhodesian opinion on increased quotas for the Rand as a means of decreasing 
clandestine migration was already on record. Increasing quotas without an appreciable 
contribution towards alleviating the problem of clandestine migration were only going to 
increase the total number of Africans migrating to the Union. Faced with the cynical 
proposals of the Union government, the Central African territories could do no more than 
plead with them to be less intransigent. In the meantime, undercapitalized Rhodesian 
employers without the resources to compete with their counterparts further South had to 
continue to contend with the ingenuity and resourcefulness of those African workers who 
sought to sell their labour in the best market possible. 
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